Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)

Authors
Peter Schulte
University of Zürich
Abstract
Sensory perceptions represent things in the outside world. This mundane fact raises a major problem for naturalistic theories of content: the ‘distality problem’. In a previous paper for this journal, I presented a solution to this problem which makes central appeal to constancy mechanisms. Justin Garson, also in this journal, recently criticized my solution and suggested a Dretskean alternative to it. Here, I defend my proposal by arguing, first, that Garson's criticisms ultimately miss the mark, and secondly, that his Dretskean alternative is not viable, because it faces two fundamental problems: the empirical problem and the problem of changing response functions.
Keywords Teleosemantics  Perceptual Content  Perceptual Constancies  Content Indeterminacy
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqab008
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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