Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences

Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219 (2012)

Authors
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9886-7
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References found in this work BETA

Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.

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Citations of this work BETA

Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

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