Critical Study


Abstract
What is Truth? is a collection of original philosophical articles by many of the central figures in the field. Most of the contributions are focused on deflationism, for and against, although other approaches have a fair airing, and some novel accounts are presented. The intrinsic worth of many of the papers apart, the interest of the collection arises, I think, from its bringing into relief a number of problematic lacunae within the extant deflationisms, which, I predict, will be the main area of controversy in the years to come.        The currently entertained options about truth may be usefully coordinated in the space opened by Frege’s work. Roughly, Frege distinguished two types of construction in which the adjective true predicatively occurs. In the first type, the predicate takes a full finite complement and has an expletive subject; e.g., It is true that violets are blue (these types may be read as extraposed versions of the type (e.g.) [the thought] that violets are blue is true.) For these constructions, Frege suggested that the contents they express are flat with the contents of their complements, i.e., to entertain the truth of a thought is not to picture the thought or its constituents in relation or correspondence with any external elements, be they facts or objects; rather, the contents of truth predications may be expressed by the contents to which truth is predicated. Hence, we have the origin of the idea behind the familiar schema (ST) TRUE(P) iff P (Let the left flank be proxy for any type of truth predication to an explicitly presented full sentential clause. Let ST to be a generalisation over the various schemata that have been forwarded.) The second type of construction which occupied Frege is where the adjective is predicated of a quantifier noun phrase with no sentential complement; e.g., Everything Bob said is true..
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