Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):199-213 (2009)

Authors
Peter H. Schwartz
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
Abstract
With the growing focus on prevention in medicine, studies of how to describe risk have become increasing important. Recently, some researchers have argued against giving patients “comparative risk information,” such as data about whether their baseline risk of developing a particular disease is above or below average. The concern is that giving patients this information will interfere with their consideration of more relevant data, such as the specific chance of getting the disease (the “personal risk”), the risk reduction the treatment provides, and any possible side effects. I explore this view and the theories of rationality that ground it, and I argue instead that comparative risk information can play a positive role in decision-making. The criticism of disclosing this sort of information to patients, I conclude, rests on a mistakenly narrow account of the goals of prevention and the nature of rational choice in medicine.
Keywords Decision making  Comparative risk  Prevention  Rationality  Expected utility theory  Biomedical ethics
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-009-9111-7
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References found in this work BETA

A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethical and Scientific Issues in Cancer Screening and Prevention.Anya Plutynski - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (3):310-323.
Comparative Risk: Good or Bad Heuristic?Peter H. Schwartz - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics 16 (5):20-22.

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