Disconnection and Responsibility

Legal Theory 18 (4):399-435 (2012)
Authors
Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Michael Moore’s Causation and Responsibility offers an integrated conception of the law, morality, and metaphysics, centered on the notion of causation, grounded in a detailed knowledge of case law, and supported on every point by cogent argument. This is outstanding work. It is a worthy successor to Harte and Honoré’s classic Causation in the Law, and I expect that it will guide discussion for many years to come.
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DOI 10.1017/S1352325212000092
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission.P. Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.
Causation by Disconnection.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.
Causation: Omissions.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):81–103.

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Citations of this work BETA

Grounding Is Not Causation.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):21-38.
Omissions as Possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.
How to Identify Negative Actions with Positive Events.Jonathan D. Payton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):87-101.
The Metaphysics of Omissions.Sara Bernstein - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (3):208-218.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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