Dialectica 69 (3):357-380 (2015)

Authors
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Francois Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Karen Donnet-Jones
University of Melbourne
Abstract
This paper articulates what it would take to defend representationalism in the case of emotions – i.e. the claim that emotions attribute evaluative properties to target objects or events. We argue that representationalism faces a significant explanatory challenge that has not yet been adequately recognized. Proponents must establish that a representation relation linking emotions and value is explanatorily necessary. We use the case of perception to bring out the difficulties in meeting this explanatory challenge
Keywords emotions  representation  value
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12108
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meaning and Emotion.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, Université de Genève
Mind-Making, Affective Regulation, and Resistance.Karen Jones, Francois Schroeter & Laura Schroeter - 2020 - Tandf: Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1):86-89.

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