History of the Human Sciences 23 (5):1-16 (2010)

Authors
Warren Schmaus
Illinois Institute of Technology
Abstract
In his lectures on pragmatism presented in the academic year 1913—14 at the Sorbonne, Durkheim argued that James’s pragmatist theory of truth, due to its emphasis on individual satisfaction, was unable to account for the obligatory, necessary and impersonal character of truth. But for Durkheim to make this charge is only to raise the question whether he himself could account for the morally obligatory or normative character of truth. Although rejecting individualism may be necessary for explaining the existence of norms, it is not sufficient. I argue that Durkheim never succeeded in providing a full account of normativity. Of course, this is a problem that remains unresolved today. Nevertheless, Durkheim took an important step beyond James in recognizing the insufficiency of his individualist account of truth
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0952695110385989
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,825
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

How to Make Our Ideas Clear.C. S. Peirce - 1878 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (Jan.):286-302.
Pragmatism and Social Theory.Hans Joas - 1993 - University of Chicago Press.
Does "Consciousness" Exist?William James - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 1 (18):477-491.
Are We Automata?William James - 1879 - Mind 4 (13):1-22.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-01

Total views
25 ( #412,439 of 2,401,527 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #257,496 of 2,401,527 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes