Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277 (2014)

Authors
Miriam Schoenfield
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Abstract: This paper defends a constraint that any satisfactory decision theory must satisfy. I show how this constraint is violated by all of the decision theories that have been endorsed in the literature that are designed to deal with cases in which opinions or values are represented by a set of functions rather than a single one. Such a decision theory is necessary to account for the existence of what Ruth Chang has called “parity” (as well as for cases in which agents have incomplete preferences or imprecise credences). The problem with the all of the decision theories that have been defended to account for parity is that they are committed to a claim I call unanimity: when all of the functions in the set agree that an agent ought to do A, then an agent ought to do A. A decision theory committed to unanimity violates the constraint I defend in this paper. Thus, if parity exists, a new approach to decision theory is necessary.
Keywords Parity  Decision Theory  Incommensurability  Imprecise Probabilities  Imprecise Value
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DOI 10.1111/phpe.12044
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

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Citations of this work BETA

Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.
Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.
Infinite Aggregation: Expanded Addition.Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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