Authors
Wolfgang Schwarz
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
How should rational beliefs change over time? The standard Bayesian answer is: by conditionalization (a.k.a. Bayes’ Rule). But conditionalization is not an adequate rule for updating beliefs in “centred” propositions whose truth-value may itself change over time. In response, some have suggested that the objects of belief must be uncentred; others have suggested that beliefs in centred propositions are not subject to diachronic norms. Iargue that these views do not offer a satisfactory account of self-locating beliefs and their dynamics. A third response is to replace conditionalization by a new norm that can deal with centred propositions. I critically survey anumber of new norms that have been proposed, and defend one particular approach.
Keywords conditionalisation  self-locating beliefs  dynamic rationality
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DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.025
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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