Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases
Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447 (2005)
| Authors |
Susan Schneider
University of Connecticut
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| Abstract |
In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases.
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| Keywords | Computation Explanation Psychology Reference Science |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00294.x |
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - MIT Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. FODOR - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
View all 39 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Edenic Theory of Reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind.Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
The Nature of Symbols in the Language of Thought.Susan Schneider - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.
View all 12 citations / Add more citations
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