Doing Things in Your Head: A Philosophical Essay on Mental Action

Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (1997)
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Abstract

John B. Watson distinguished between the objective study of human behavior and the subjective study of consciousness. Like Watson I hold that human behavior is the subject of psychology; but there are problems with Watson's distinction. First, most observable human behavior is itself conscious; and second, some conscious behavior does not involve overt movement at all. Many behaviors, indeed many actions, are performed 'in the head'. ;I advance a theory in which behavior is a single general kind; mental and overt behavior are merely two interestingly distinct forms. Most behavior depends on prior events in which the behaver learns from sensory experience. Thus I develop a naturalizing theory of representation which treats the brain as a medium in which representational structures are formed when we interact with the world around us. These representational neuro-structures are utilized in the production of behavior. The resulting mental and overt behaviors are likewise representational and can be interpreted as meaningful. ;The medium theory of representation provides a framework in which to understand mental and overt behaviors. Mental behaviors differ from overt behaviors in that they involve the active suppression of bodily movement. Suppression is, in my theory, central to the distinction between behavior and action; and thus, to my account of rudimentary action and the closely related mental behavior of desiring, and to more complex forms of action, including 'situated' behaviors, speech acts, deliberate action and mental acts. ;Finally I turn to the things we do 'in our heads', and the varied consequences of the different ways and circumstances in which we perform these mental acts. The consequences that are of greatest interest concern our conceptions of agency and the mind. Here it is of central importance that we learn to internalize behaviors within the context of the overt practices and activities that constitute a society. This approach to human behavior yields a picture, not of a mind, but of a mental life which can take on many forms. The dominant forms of our mental life are best understood within the context of the social environment in which we develop

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