Events

Erkenntnis 20 (3):281 - 293 (1983)
Abstract
Despite important similarities, events differ from states of affairs. Recent theories of events (Davidson's, Kim's) have ignored the distinction, preferring to focus on relations of composition between events and states, indifferently conceived, and properties, objects, and times. It might be proposed, however, that events and states can be distinguished by their composition. I argue against a compositional approach, in favor of a modal approach, on which events are distinguished from states in virtue of being essentially dynamic. This view locates the difference between events and states in their different existential statuses. While the view neither endorses nor forecloses dependency relations between events, states, and objects, it offers ways to do some of the explanatory work that recent theories assign to composition relations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00166390
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,810
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Dynamic Events and Presentism.Francesco Orilia - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):407-414.
Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 474--493.
Spatiotemporal and Spatial Particulars.Noa Latham - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):17-35.
Events.Susan Schneider - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
42 ( #128,026 of 2,202,778 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #150,076 of 2,202,778 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature