Enactive affordances and the interplay of biological and phenomenological subjectivity

Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):315-317 (2016)
Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Enactive approaches highlight the deep interdependency of brains, action, agency, and environment in shaping the world we inhabit. This perspective goes beyond input-output models of cognition, postulating instead closed loops of action and perception framed by the agent-environment complementarity. As a unique, dynamical, system, no representational recovery is required for cognitive-behavioral experience to take place.
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