Experience and Evidence

Mind 122 (487):699-747 (2013)
Authors
Susanna Schellenberg
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities that we have in virtue of being perceivers. In showing that both kinds of evidence have the same rational source, I provide a unified account of perceptual evidence and its rational source in perceptual experience.
Keywords evidence  perceptual justification  internalism and externalism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzt088
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References found in this work BETA

The Silence of the Senses.Charles S. Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Finkish Dispositions.David Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Experience and Content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
Highlights of Recent Epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.
Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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