Philosophy of Science 72 (5):675-686 (2005)

Authors
Warren Schmaus
Illinois Institute of Technology
Abstract
There is a lack of connection between the cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary approaches to the study of the mind, in philosophy as well as the sciences. For instance, although Millikan may display a thorough understanding of evolutionary theory in her arguments for the adaptive value of substance concepts, she gives scant attention to what could be the neural substrates of these concepts. Neuroscience research calls into question her assumption that substance concepts play a role in practical skills and suggests that conceptual knowledge in the brain may be organized by perceptual features rather than by individuals and natural kinds.
Keywords COMMON STRUCTURE   SINBAD
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1086/508107
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