Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111 (2001)
Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.
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References found in this work BETA
Responsibility for Self.Charles Taylor - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 281--99.
Citations of this work BETA
Corporeal Selfhood, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative Selfhood.Diana Tietjens Meyers - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):141-153.
Interdisciplinary Workshop Report: Methodology and 'Personhood and Identity in Medicine'.Elselijn Kingma & Mary Margaret McCabe - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1057-1063.
The Narrative Sense of Self.Peter Goldie - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1064-1069.
Children's Agency, Interests, and Medical Consent.Jennifer Baker - 2013 - HEC Forum 25 (4):311-324.
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