Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111 (2001)

Marya Schechtman
University of Illinois, Chicago
Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.
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DOI 10.1080/10002001058538710
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
The Thread of Life.Richard Wollheim - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Responsibility for Self.Charles Taylor - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 281--99.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Sameness and the Self: Philosophical and Psychological Considerations.Stan Klein - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception 5:1-15.
Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Still Life, a Mirror: Phasic Memory and Re-Encounters with Artworks.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):423-446.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

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