Expressivism concerning epistemic modals

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):601-615 (2010)

Authors
Benjamin Schnieder
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
I develop a new argument for an expressivist account of epistemic modals, which starts from a puzzle about epistemic modals which Seth Yalcin recently presented. I reject Yalcin's own solution to the puzzle, and give a better explanation based on expressivism concerning epistemic modals. I also address two alleged problems for expressivism: do embeddings of epistemic modals pose a serious threat to expressivism, and how can expressivism account for disagreements about statements containing epistemic modals?
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.643.x
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