Explanatory force, antidescriptionism, and the common structure of substance concepts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):84-85 (1998)
Millikan's proposal of a common structure of substance concepts does not explain certain conspicuous findings in the psychological literature such as typicality effects, the context sensitivity of these effects, and slips of the tongue. Moreover, it is unclear how antidescriptionism could be relevant to psychological theorizing. Finally, it does not seem to be true that concepts of individuals, stuff, and real kinds have a common structure in older children and in adults.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X98440408
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