Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591 (2014)

Authors
Alfred Schramm
University of Graz
Abstract
Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this concept is defined and its introduction motivated. Further, I introduce and explain the distinction between support and confirmation: put in a slogan, ‘confirmation is support by significant evidence’. The second section deals with the Riddle itself. I demonstrate that, given the provisions of the first section, not ‘anything confirms anything’: significant green-evidence confirms only green-hypotheses (and no grue-hypotheses), and significant grue-evidence confirms only grue-hypotheses (and no green-hypotheses), whichever terms we use for expressing these evidences or hypotheses. The third section rounds off my treatment. First I show that Frank Jackson’s use of his counterfactual condition is unsuccessful. Further, I argue that no unwanted consequences result, if one starts from the other, ‘objective’, definition of ‘grue’, as it constitutes no more than a mere fact of logic that cannot do any harm. Finally, I present a grue-case involving both kinds of definition, where the exclusive confirmation of either the green- or the grue-hypothesis is shown.
Keywords Induction (general)  New Riddle of Induction  Nelson Goodman  Evidence  Confirmation  Counterfactuals
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9524-6
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

I Bet You'll Solve Goodman's Riddle.Wolfgang Freitag - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):254-267.
Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.
The Selective Confirmation Answer to the Paradox of the Ravens.William Peden - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):177-193.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Barker and Achinstein on Goodman.Gary Sollazzo - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (1-2):91 - 97.

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