Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers

Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153 (2012)
Authors
Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the stability of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01438.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,225
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From.Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.

View all 65 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-03-24

Total downloads
213 ( #22,767 of 2,242,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #86,644 of 2,242,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature