Epistemic modals and informational consequence

Synthese 174 (3):385 - 395 (2010)
Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data.
Keywords Epistemic modals  Yalcin  Non-classical consequence  Moore’s paradox
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Seth Yalcin (2007). Epistemic Modals. Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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