Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546 (2004)

Robert Schroer
University of Minnesota, Duluth
Environmental representationalism is the position that phenomenal differences between visual experiences are determined by the representational claims those experiences make about the surrounding environment. Afterimage and phosphene experiences are an important and widely cited objection to this position. In this paper, I defend environmental representationalism from this objection. In particular, I point out several ways in which typical environmental representationalist accounts of these experiences are lacking while developing a more satisfying account which focuses on how the visual system generates its representations as well as on several of the unique temporally-extended features of afterimage/phosphene experiences.
Keywords Afterimages  Environment  Epistemology  Phosphenes  Representationalism
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01006.x
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.

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Afterimages and Sensation.Ian Phillips - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.

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