In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan (2010)
Although there is a massive amount of work on truth, there is very little work on falsity. Most philosophers probably think this is appropriate; after all, once we have a solid understanding of truth, falsity should not prove to be much of a challenge. However, there are several interesting and difficult issues associated with understanding falsity. After considering two prominent definitions of falsity and presenting objections to each one, I propose a definition that avoids their problems.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity.Heinrich Wansing - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
Analysis of the Second and Fourth Definitions of Mithyātva in the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.Gianni Pellegrini - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):441-459.
Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland.Neil Tennant - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):89-96.
Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning.Jan Woleński - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):137-141.
Semantics with Only One Bedeutung.Sergey Pavlov - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:81-85.
Minimalism and the Definability of Truth.Gabriel Sandu - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:143-153.
Added to index2010-10-31
Total downloads20 ( #248,475 of 2,171,798 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?