David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92 (2011)
Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. However, that result depends on a very strong equal relevance condition on individual pieces of evidence. In this essay, we prove tracking results for focused correlation analogous to Wheeler and Scheines’s results but for cases involving unequal relevance. Our result is robust as well, and we retain conditions for bidirectional tracking between incremental confirmation measures and focused correlation.
|Keywords||focused correlation coherence measures truth conduciveness incremental confirmation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2014). State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Gregory Wheeler (2012). Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
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Lydia McGrew (forthcoming). Accounting for Dependence: Relative Consilience as a Correction Factor in Cumulative Case Arguments. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2013). Confirmation as Partial Entailment: A Representation Theorem in Inductive Logic. Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.
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