Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism

It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘ faultless disagreement ’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessment. I argue that the sort of faultless disagreement present in these cases is in fact compatible with a realist treatment of their semantics. Then I briefly consider other considerations that might be thought to speak against realism about these areas of discourse. I conclude with the tentative suggestion that realism about matters of taste is far more plausible than most philosophers believe today
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00391.x
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The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.

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