In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 89-113 (2017)

Authors
Dennis Schulting
University of Warwick (PhD)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Kant  unity of apperception  necessary application of the categories  transcendental deduction  transcendental proof
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
DOI 10.1515/9783110560794-007
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Problems From Kant.James van Cleve - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):637-640.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kant’s Deduction and Apperception: Explaining the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2012 - London and Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan.
A Deduction From Apperception?Andrew Stephenson - 2014 - Studi Kantiani 27:77-86.
Deducing the Categories of Modality and Relation - Reich Revisited.Dennis Schulting - 2008 - In Valerio Rohden, Riccardo Terra & Guido de Almeida (eds.), Akten des 10. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. de Gruyter. pp. 691--702.
On Strawson on Kantian Apperception.Dennis Schulting - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.
Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):59-84.
Kant's Transcendental Explanation of Our Objective Knowledge.Ka-Cheong Chun - 1995 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-16

Total views
294 ( #36,775 of 2,518,446 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #25,653 of 2,518,446 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes