Hume and The Self: A Critical Response

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):15-30 (2007)
In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness.
Keywords Hume
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2007.5.1.15
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A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle on Consciousness.Victor Caston - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):751-815.

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