Hard cases for combining expressivism and deflationist truth: Conditionals and epistemic modals

In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Abstract

In this paper I will be concerned with the question as to whether expressivist theories of meaning can coherently be combined with deflationist theories of truth. After outlining what I take expressivism to be and what I take deflationism about truth to be, I’ll explain why I don’t take the general version of this question to be very hard, and why the answer is ‘yes’. Having settled that, I’ll move on to what I take to be a more pressing and interesting version of the question, arising from a prima facie tension between deflationism about truth and the motivations underlying expressivism for what I take to be two of its most promising applications: to indicative conditionals and epistemic modals. Here I’ll argue that the challenge is substantive, but that there is no conceptual obstacle to its being met, provided that one’s expressivism takes the right form

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Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California

References found in this work

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

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