Hegel on Determinate Religion

With his important, history-contextualizing study, Jon Stewart has drawn renewed attention to Hegel’s often neglected philosophical interpretation of determinate religion. He focuses on Hegel’s philosophical reading of distinct historical religions, in which Hegel brings them together in serial fashion. In so doing, Hegel proposes a unique philosophy of determinate religion which constitutes an essential element in his philosophical argument in favor of the consummate religion, historically instantiated in Christianity. Stewart’s study is, in effect, an invitation to look again at Hegel’s monumental effort to comprehend religion in its varied historical realizations. The present article proposes to respond to this invitation in a preliminary and modest way. We note various claims Hegel makes regarding his philosophy of determinate religion and then identify a number of challenges arising from these claims. Against this background of claims and challenges, we conclude with an appreciation of Stewart’s work. The appreciation proceeds in four steps: first, a recall of what Stewart intends to do, the focus he adopts, and the theses he argues; second, a review of his emphasis on Hegel’s contexts and sources; third, several remarks on his reading of Hegel on determinate religion; fourth, a reflection on important contributions Stewart makes to the present and future study of Hegel on determinate religion.