In Paul Russell (ed.), Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Karl Schafer
University of Texas at Austin
In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.
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