Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71 (2008)

Authors
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California
Abstract
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been--wrongly--wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe.
Keywords Reasons  Subjective  Objective  Bernard Williams  Epistemology  Evidence  Basing
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9102-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,480
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What Apparent Reasons Appear to Be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.

View all 68 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Voices of Reason.Chrisoula Andreou - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):33 - 45.
Having Reasons and the Factoring Account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.
Internal Reasons and Practical Limits on Rational Deliberation.Carolyn Mason - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses.Francesco Orsi - 2008 - Etica and Politica / Ethics and Politics 10 (2):19-41.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
554 ( #9,170 of 2,330,618 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #35,235 of 2,330,618 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes