Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230 (2017)
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In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β-ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β-shapes/β-sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β-property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing-in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three-dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three-dimensional object. Using this new account, I re-examine the phenomenological directness of visual experience and undermine an argument for skepticism about β-property experiences.
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DOI | 10.1111/mila.12141 |
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References found in this work BETA
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
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Citations of this work BETA
Object Files and Unconscious Perception: A Reply to Quilty-Dunn.Ian Phillips - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):293-301.
Are Perspectival Shapes Seen or Imagined? An Experimental Approach.John Schwenkler & Assaf Weksler - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):855-877.
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