How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation

Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46 (2000)
Abstract
Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Knowing  Metaphysics  Visual
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DOI 10.5840/philtopics20002824
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The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation.Sean Allen‐Hermanson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
The Case for Moral Perception.J. Jeremy Wisnewski - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):129-148.

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