How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation

Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46 (2000)
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Abstract

Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience

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2009-01-28

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Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
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The empirical case against introspection.Rik Peels - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
Phenomenal Holism and Cognitive Phenomenology.Martina Fürst - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8): 3259–3289..

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References found in this work

Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
What is it like to be me?Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.

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