Dialogue 51 (2):289-312 (2012)

Authors
Greg Scherkoske
Dalhousie University
Abstract
ABSTRACT: Among recent criticisms of impartial moral theories, especially in consequentialist and deontological forms, Bernard Williams’ integrity objection is perhaps the most tantalizing. This objection is a complaint—at once both general and deep—that impartial moral theories are systematically incapable of finding room for integrity in human life and character. Kantians have made forceful responses to this integrity objection and have moved on. Consequentialists have found the objection more trying. I offer reasons to think that consequentialists too can safely move on. These reasons suggest the relationship between integrity and impartiality is less antagonistic than often supposed.RÉSUMÉ : Parmi les récentes critiques des théories morales impartiales, notamment les critiques conséquentialiste et déontologique, l’objection d’intégrité de Bernard Williams est possiblement la plus attrayante. Cette objection—à la fois générale et profonde—reproche aux théories morales impartiales d’être incapables de retrouver l’intégrité dans la vie et le caractère humains. Les kantiens ont répondu vigoureusement à cette objection, puis sont passés à autre chose. Les conséquentialistes ont trouvé l’objection plus éprouvante. Je soutiens que les conséquentialistes peuvent, eux aussi, passer à autre chose, en suggérant que le rapport entre l’intégrité et l’impartialité est moins antagonique que supposé. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Integrity and Impartial MoralityVolume 51, Issue 2Greg Scherkoske DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217312000455Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission.
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1981 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Equality, Priority, and Compassion.Roger Crisp - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):745-763.

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Citations of this work BETA

Integrity.Damian Cox - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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