Intellectualism and the argument from cognitive science

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
Authors
Zoe Drayson
University of California, Davis
Arieh Schwartz
University of California, Davis
Abstract
Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that findings from cognitive science provide evidence about the nature of mental states. We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to Intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this naturalistic metaphysics, and even rely on it to claim that cognitive science support Intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific findings can have metaphysical import. We argue that this situation is preventing productive debate about Intellectualism, which would benefit from both sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions.
Keywords Intellectualism  Cognitive science  Know how  Propositional knowledge  Practical knowledge  Procedural memory  Declarative memory
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Practical Guide to Intellectualism.Yuri Cath - 2008 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
Why Intellectualism Still Fails.Andreas Ditter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):500-515.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:00-00.
Skill in Epistemology II: Skill and Know How.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.
Intellectualism and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):1-9.
(Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):374-397.
The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How.Will Small - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-30

Total views
44 ( #156,267 of 2,313,513 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #10,007 of 2,313,513 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature