In-between believing

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82 (2001)
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Keywords Bayesianism  Believing  Epistemology  Proposition
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00215
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.

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