In-between believing

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82 (2001)
Authors
Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Bayesianism  Believing  Epistemology  Proposition
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00215
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
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