In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting

Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent with the account of knowledge and successfully deals with fake barns.

Similar books and articles

What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Epistemic value and achievement.Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Ratio 25 (2):216-230.
Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.
How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.


Added to PP

514 (#36,777)

6 months
84 (#57,702)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.
Kant on Method.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):531-549.
Replies to Schafer, Schroeder, and Staffel.Errol Lord - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):476-487.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations