Cognitive Science 38 (5):851-880 (2014)

Authors
Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo
Abstract
We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention
Keywords Planning  Emotion  Neural engineering framework  Semantic pointers  Automatic  Action  Deliberative  Implementation intentions  Intention
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DOI 10.1111/cogs.12100
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References found in this work BETA

Metaphors We Live By.George Lakoff & Mark Johnson - 1980 - University of Chicago Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2):220-242.

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