Is Gibbard a Realist?

Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication.
Keywords Gibbard  expressivism  metaethical realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v1i2.9
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 44,474
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

.Peter Railton - 1985 - Rowman & Littlefield.
Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms.Ralph Wedgwood - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30.
A Slim Semantics for Thin Moral Terms?Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):191 – 207.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics.Caroline T. Arruda - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):471-490.
All That Jazz: Linguistic Competence and Improvisation.Niklas Möller - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):237-250.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
383 ( #14,361 of 2,273,204 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #28,202 of 2,273,204 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature