Authors
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Abstract
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication.
Keywords Gibbard  expressivism  metaethical realism
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v1i2.9
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References found in this work BETA

Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1985 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

All That Jazz: Linguistic Competence and Improvisation.Niklas Möller - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):237-250.
Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics.Caroline T. Arruda - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):471-490.

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