Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism

Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340 (2018)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Berislav Marušić
Brandeis University
Abstract
We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them.
Keywords intention  action  practical reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12133
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.
How Humeans Can Make Normative Beliefs Motivating.William Ratoff - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief.Carlos Núñez - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.

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