Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340 (2018)

Authors
John Schwenkler
Florida State University
Berislav Marušić
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them.
Keywords intention  action  practical reasoning
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12133
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 86 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Know-How, Action, and Luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.
Fallibility for Expressivists.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):763-777.
Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
How to Contradict an Expression of Intention.John Schwenkler - forthcoming - In Christopher Frey & Jennifer Frey (eds.), Practical Truth. Oxford University Press.
A Solution to the Many Attitudes Problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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