Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618 (2007)

Authors
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Abstract
It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity.
Keywords Semantic externalism  Self-knowledge  Privileged access to content
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400701654820
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,178
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.

View all 60 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Shared Modes of Presentation.Simon Prosser - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):465-482.
Why Be an Anti-Individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.
Bootstrapping Our Way to Samesaying.Laura Schroeter - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):177-197.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
441 ( #19,058 of 2,455,099 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,282 of 2,455,099 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes