Lucky joint action

Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that joint action permits a certain degree of luck. The cases I have in mind exhibit the following structure: each participant believes that the intended ends of each robustly support the joint action. This belief turns out to be false. Due to lucky circumstances, the discordance in intention never becomes common knowledge. However, common knowledge of the relevant intentions would have undermined the joint action altogether. The analysis of such cases shows the extent to which common knowledge of the participants’ intentions can be harmful to joint action. This extends a recent line of research that has questioned the necessity of common knowledge in joint action.

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action.Cedric Paternotte - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Just How Joint Is Joint Action in Infancy?Malinda Carpenter - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):380-392.
Joint Action and Recursive Consciousness of Consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):769-779.
Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
Joint Attention in Joint Action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Collective Emotions and Joint Action.Salmela Mikko & Nagatsu Michiru - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1):33-57.
Practical Knowledge and Acting Together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-06-08

Downloads
218 (#56,119)

6 months
26 (#42,182)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julius Schönherr
Peking University

References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references