Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Mind:fzw065 (forthcoming)
Abstract
Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, it can't be rational to adopt a credence on the edge of that range. But Permissivism says that, for some such range, any credence in that range is rational. Permissivism, in its traditional form, cannot be right. I consider some new ways of developing Permissivism to avoid this argument, but each has problems of its own.
Keywords epistemic permissivism  epistemic uniqueness
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzw065
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