Authors
Kevin Scharp
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading within the secondary literature on reflection and discuss its consequences for interpretations of Locke’s views on empiricism, knowledge, and personal identity.
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DOI 10.1080/09608780701789285
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):424-429.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.

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The State of the Responsible Research and Innovation Programme.George Inyila Ogoh & N. Ben Fairweather - 2019 - Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 17 (2):145-166.

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