Metaphilosophy 47 (3):431-448 (2016)

Authors
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
University of Southampton
Abstract
According to “disjunctivist neo-Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, it can also be claimed to be known. If the latter is not possible, this is not because certain propositions are either “intrinsically” conversationally inappropriate or else “rationally groundless”, but rather that we are dealing with something that merely presents us with the appearance of being an epistemic claim.
Keywords Pritchard  Wittgenstein  disjunctivist neo‐Mooreanism  hinge propositions  radical scepticism  closure principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/meta.12186
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,795
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.
On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright, A. C. Danto & M. Bochner - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):261-262.
Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:221-238.
Sense and Certainty.Marie Mcginn - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):635-637.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Animal in Epistemology.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):97-119.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism?Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):202-217.
How to Be a Neo-Moorean.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 68--99.
Is `God Exists' a `Hinge Proposition' of Religious Belief?Duncan Pritchard - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):129-140.
‘Hinge Propositions’ and the ‘Logical’ Exclusion of Doubt.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):165-181.
Wittgenstein on Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.
The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.
Contextualism and Radical Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4733-4750.
Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-07-08

Total views
13 ( #725,888 of 2,425,653 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #546,862 of 2,425,653 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes