Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715 (2006)

Authors
Joshua Schechter
Brown University
Abstract
In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
Keywords Analyticity  Justification  Internalism and Externalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00629.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic?Joshua Schechter - 2013 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. pp. 214.
The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.

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