Maximizing as satisficing: On pattern matching and probability maximizing in groups and individuals

, &
Cognition 205 (C):104382 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104382

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Bentham’s Binary Form of Maximizing Utilitarianism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):87-109.
The plausibility of satisficing and the role of good in ordinary thought.Mark Van Roojen - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press.
Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends.Robert Bass - manuscript
Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn't.James Dreier - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.
Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y. Chappell - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 498-512.
What Makes a Good Decision? Robust Satisficing as a Normative Standard of Rational Decision Making.Barry Schwartz, Yakov Ben-Haim & Cliff Dacso - 2011 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 41 (2):209-227.
Satisficing: The Rationality of Preferring What is Good Enough.Michael E. Weber - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
A new defense of satisficing.Michael Weber - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77--106.
Two views of satisficing.Michael Slote - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 14--29.
Satisficing: Not good enough.Henry S. Richardson - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 106--130.
Satisficing as a humanly rational strategy.David Schmidtz - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30--59.
Two kinds of satisficing.Thomas Hurka - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):107 - 111.
Rethinking Demandingness: Why Satisficing Consequentialism and Scalar Consequentialism are not Less Demanding than Maximizing Consequentialism.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-8.
Deontic Constraints are Maximizing Rules.Matthew Hammerton - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):571-588.
In defense of a version of satisficing consequentialism.Jason Rogers - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):198-221.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-08-25

Downloads
7 (#1,360,984)

6 months
4 (#800,606)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Rational choice and the structure of the environment.Herbert A. Simon - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):129-138.
Verbal reports as data.K. Anders Ericsson & Herbert A. Simon - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):215-251.

View all 10 references / Add more references