Modalised conditionals: a response to Willer

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):673-682 (2013)
Abstract
A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations
Keywords Indicative conditionals  Epistemic modals  Modalised conditionals  Suppositional view
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9838-7
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.

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