Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248 (2009)

Authors
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California
Abstract
Intentions matter. They have some kind of normative impact on our agency. Something goes wrong when an agent intends some end and fails to carry out the means she believes to be necessary for it, and something goes right when, intending the end, she adopts the means she thinks are required. This has even been claimed to be one of the only uncontroversial truths in ethical theory. But not only is there widespread disagreement about why this is so, there is widespread disagreement about in what sense it is so. In this paper I explore an underdeveloped answer to the question of in what sense it is so, and argue that resolving an apparent difficulty with this view leads to an attractive picture about why it is so
Keywords Intention  Instrumental rationality  Means-end coherence  Wide-scope  Bratman  Broome  Ewing  Setiya  Three-envelope problem  Reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9200-x
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.

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