Matching sensible qualities: A skeleton in the closet for representationalism

Philosophical Studies 107 (3):259-73 (2002)
Abstract
The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color is a threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to all realist theories of sensible qualities, including the current leading realist theory: representationalism. I save representationalism from this threat by way of a novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about the introspective classification of sensible qualities of color. I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's ability to extract fine-grained information about color from the environment, introspective classification of sensible qualities of color is sensitive to features of context. I finish by arguing for the superiority of my solution over two alternative solutions: one by Nelson Goodman, the other by C.L. Hardin.
Keywords Color  Experience  Metaphysics  Perception  Quality  Representation
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DOI 10.1023/A:1014534812338
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